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Abstract: Research has consistently show divergent economic outcomes between men and 
women following divorce. Typically men fare better with either small declines in income or even 
small gains, whereas women and children face tougher financial penalties. These findings 
however have not been consistent both in their amount and also their explanations and so 
valid questions remain. Through multivariate regression using the British household panel 
survey (BHPS) between 1992-2008, this paper seeks to examine key theories which attempt 
to explain the greater female income divorce penalty; including the unequal distribution of 
costs associated with children, propensity and association of working part-time and the 
implication of work place absences due to family care during marriage on human capital and 
lower incomes following divorce. This paper finds a consistent financial penalty of around 
20% for divorced women and a small premium for divorced men which is sensitive to the 
inclusion of child custody within econometric models. In addition the penalty associated with 
divorced women appears sensitive to variables which seek to model lower human capital 
arising from reduced labour supply during marriage, though much more analysis and caution 
with regards to this finding and it’s generalizability  is advised.  
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Introduction & History 
 
Today and historically the topic of the gender disparities in the economic consequences of 
divorce has been a critical and much debated one. Underlying these debates has been 
concern over the rise of divorce witnessed broadly until the 1990s, the association between 
divorce, lone parenthood and poverty and also the frequent poorer educational and social 
outcomes for the children of divorce (Andreβ 2006, Assave et al 2007, Burkhauser, 
Duncan & Berntsen 1990, De Wilde 2003, Fausta et al 2009, Hoffman & Duncan 1985, 
1988, Jarvis & Jenkins 1999, Peterson 1996, Regt et al 2012, Smock et al 1999, Uunk 2004, 
Uunk & De Wilde 2008, Weitzman 1985).  Many current studies have consistently shown 
how financially men and women fair differently, though to different degrees across a 
variety of contexts, even after controlling for economically relevant characteristics (Andreβ 
2006, Assave et al 2007, Burkhauser, Duncan & Berntsen 1990, De Wilde 2003, Fausta et 
al 2009, Hoffman & Duncan 1985, 1988, Jarvis & Jenkins 1999, Peterson 1996, Regt et al 
2012, Smock et al 1999, Uunk 2004, Uunk & De Wilde 2008, Weitzman 1985). Typically 
women fair much worse than men on financial measures alone, with men’s incomes either 
deteriorating less, or even increasing once they have less with whom to share. When one 
considers how important divorce is as a move into lone parenthood and the intendant 
association with child poverty, likelihood to seek  social security and state welfare, the 
relevance and pertinence of questions over  precisely how much and why is clear. 
 
 For divorcees financial support is available from three main sources; labour 
market earnings, welfare support and child or spousal maintenance payments from ex 
partners. In different contexts welfare support and child maintenance payments have been 
shown to narrow the gap between genders, however in most cases, with welfare and 
maintenance payments often low, the gender gap in the economic consequences of divorce 
persists (Andreβ 2006, , Assave et al 2007, De Wilde 2003, Jarvis & Jenkins 1999, Uunk 
2004). Consequently what this means, and particularly in the United Kingdom, is that 
labour market earnings are the predominant source of income for divorcees and it is this 
difference between divorced men and women which this study seeks to quantify and 
explain.  
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 This study seeks to examine and quantify firstly, the overall difference between 
men and women following divorce but also the link between the custody of children, 
reduced labour supply and loss of human capital during marriage with income declines for 
women following divorce. Typically it is much more likely that mothers retain custody of 
children following divorce and this can affect their incomes through a variety of ways, 
including the hours available to work, their financial cost, or simply the stress of working 
and raising a family alone. The cost of childcare and its availability can theoretically often 
also effect mothers labour supply leading to reduced, flexible or around school time hours 
which can have a relationship with reduced household income via available and suitable 
jobs ((Budig and England 2001, Budig et al 2012). Additionally many mothers can have 
work-place absences during marriage to raise a family, either fully, working part-time or 
taking a career secondary to their partners which can impact their incomes through 
reduced labour market experience and human capital. It is these three things which this 
study seeks to quantify with regards to the United Kingdom between 1992 and 2008, 
therefore providing a relatively large, compared to other UK studies, and long study of UK 
income data  
 
These four research questions as to why and how much are highly relevant, as 
an analysis of the role of divorces as a route into lone parenthood and poverty in the 1980s 
and the years directly prior to the sample used here shows.  In the year directly prior to this 
sample, 1991, single parent female families made up 17.5% of all families with dependent 
children and roughly a third, at 6.3% were from divorce (Lewsis & Kiernan 1996).  
Research on these individuals economic status shows acutely why this is relevant in that 
59% were receiving state benefits, 60% of all families with children receiving means tested 
income support were lone mothers and only one in three of these received regular 
maintenance from fathers (Lewis & Kiernan 1996). When one also considers that this 
maintenance was also typically low, representing only 7% of income at the time of analysis, 
the questions over exactly what, quantitatively, the economic consequences of divorce are 
for women and the reasons why are important (Lewis and Kiernan 1996).  
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Figure 1 Lone Parent families in the UK. Source: Office for 
National Statistics (ONS) 2012.  
   
Today many of these figures have increased, but the story is largely similar. Lone 
parent families, as can be seen from figure one, have steadily grown to almost two million 
people and representing 26% of all families with dependent children (Office for National 
Statistics, ONS, 2012). Additionally 92% of all lone parent families in the UK were female 
and only 8% male. When compared to other European countries the UK has both the 
highest rate of single parent households at 20.4% compared to a European mean of 9.1%, 
but also of single parent female households at 18.1% to a European mean of 9.1% 
(European Labourforce survey 2010). When one looks at the distribution of children 
within households the UK also has the highest number of children in single parent 
households at 28.1% of all children coming from single female homes compared to a 
European average of 16% (European Labourforce survey 2010).  This means the UK 
population is arguably particularly prone to any negative effects of the economic 
consequences of divorce, with the highest number of single parent households, single 
female parent households and children within single parent households.  
 
These figures make these research questions over how much and why even more 
important when one considers available research on the association of lone parenthood on 
the quality of life of the parents and children involved, beyond the financial reduction 
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associated with divorce. A study in Sweden found lone mothers have been shown to be at 
greater risk of premature death owing to the financial and emotional stress of parenting 
alone (Weitoft, Haglund & Rosén 2000). They have been shown to experience a greater 
volume of health and financial difficulties which, it has been argued, leads to a greater 
likelihood of mortality through suicide, violence and alcohol related deaths (Weitoft, 
Haglund & Rosén 2000).  
 
In addition there has been ample evidence of the relationship between divorce and 
poor outcomes for the children of divorce. Studies have found not only an association 
between lone parenthood and a greater propensity for child poverty, but also an association 
between short term economic stresses, such as that associated with an income decline 
following divorce, and also the effect of lone parenthood on the quality of the home and 
emotional support (Miller & Davis 1997, Thomas & Sawhill 2005). In their 1997 study 
Miller and Davis (1997) found that the quality of emotional support and resources in the 
home, as rated by the interviewer for the National Longitudinal Survey of youth, was worse 
for lone parents, particularly at the middle income range and went down during moments 
of short term economic stress potentially having an association with child development 
(Miller & Davies 1997).  
 
Indeed even today, in light of the number and greater likelihood of divorced 
mothers to need to access state support than fathers in the UK, the enforcement of child 
support payments remains a topical issue. Evidence of this can be seen in recent changes in 
2010 to legislation from which the state has begun to tax child maintenance payments 
between ex partners using the governments’ child support agency (Department for work 
and pensions 2015). Moreover partners failing to make adequate or on time payments may 
face consequences through negative amendments to their credit ratings (Department for 
work and pensions 2015). The justification has been to provide an incentive for ex partners 
to come to an amicable, private agreement without needing to turn to state support, a 
theme which has been common to British governmental policy towards divorcees welfare 
support historically and more generally today (DWP 2015). 
 
Historically divorce or, before divorce laws, separation has also been relatively 
much easier for male divorcees, who have been able to support themselves to a much 
greater degree through individual labour market earnings and may even gain through 
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keeping a greater share of their income; for women and children, this support has varied 
across time and geography in relation to attitudes towards female involvement in the 
labour market, state support for the conditions of lone mothers and the ability and 
willingness to enforce maintenance payments from separated fathers (Thane 1978, Lewis & 
Kiernan 1996, Gordon 2001).   
 
 Divorce, desertion or separation as routes into female and child poverty are 
not modern inventions; marital breakup and desertion have long been associated with 
moves into poverty for women and children, as research into the development of and 
applicants to the poor law in Victorian England show. Deserted, unmarried and widowed 
mothers formed the majority of poor law applicants and their experiences of its indignity 
varied greatly by geography (Thane 1978). In some areas deserted wives and mothers were 
able to apply for poor relief;  in some outdoor relief was available in which they were 
allowed to live in their own homes, in others deserted wives and children were subjected to 
the devastating conditions and shame of indoor relief in the workhouse (Thane 1978).  
 
  The scope, scale and type of support for deserted wives and families varied 
over time with the prevalence and support for ideas of the breadwinner family and also the 
preference, still prevalent today in the British welfare system, for a private financial solution 
between partners instead of a government welfare solution (Thane 1978, Andreβ 2006). 
These ideas coupled together to give a preference for male employment, as seen through 
the poor laws, union access for workers, and an aversion to legitimising family types 
beyond the breadwinner ideal through state support at any sufficient level. What this 
support meant is that able bodied men were more able to support themselves economically 
and subsequently, with support from deserting partners low and extremely patchy, state 
relief for deserted families meagre, brutal and varied, the outcome was of extreme hardship 
for deserted wives, mothers and their children (Thane 1978).    
 
 In the US during the 20th century federal aid programs were developed in a 
background of similar narratives of both concerns for the plight of deserted, lone and 
widowed women, mothers and children in poverty, and  a tension between not wanting to 
encourage or legitimize family forms deemed unacceptable or unhealthy by mainstream 
opinion (Gordon 2001).  In eligibility for benefits women were scrutinized on their 
eligibility, which varied under different acts and services depending on such criteria 
through the century (Gordon 2001). As well as this, the inequalities between men and 
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women in the labour market were compounded in much the same way as in 19th century 
Britain by either denial of or too low benefits and low or patchy maintenance payments. 
An example of this in action was the denial of benefits in the 1940s to agricultural or 
domestic workers, which both had a prominent gender and racial dimension, from access 
to federal aid programs under a series of amendments to the social security act (Gordon 
2001).  This meant that not only were womens wages likely to be lower, but access to 
income support of unemployment benefits was restricted to the most economically 
disadvantaged partner after the marital breakup, further compounding the gender inequity 
(Gordon 2001). 
 
 What these two brief histories show is that the problems of gender inequality 
in the economic consequence of divorce, or in these cases separation before divorce laws, 
have not been equal. Separation or desertion have long been roads into female and child 
poverty. Welfare support has often been too low to fill the gap along with preferences for a 
private solution or reticence about being seen to support single person households. As well 
as this, husbands have also been more able to support themselves economically through 
the Labour market. It is this difference this paper seeks to assess through contemporary 
economic data in order to quantify the difference, but also its determinants.  
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Previous Research 
 
The substantial bulk of previous research on the distribution of the economic 
consequences of divorce has been consistent in showing a negative economic impact 
associated with divorce; however its distribution has not been evenly shared by men, 
women and their dependent children (Andreβ 2006, Assave et al 2007, Burkhauser, 
Duncan & Berntsen 1990, De Wilde 2003, Fausta et al 2009, Hoffman & Duncan 1985, 
1988, Jarvis & Jenkins 1999, Peterson 1996, Regt et al 2012, Smock et al 1999, Uunk 2004, 
Uunk & De Wilde 2008, Weitzman 1985). Though of course direct coefficients and 
declines cannot easily be compared outside of the original study, due to differences in the 
measures and the methods used the picture by sex is a largely consistent one in which 
women bare the significant brunt, at least financially of the economic costs of divorce. 
Women in almost all of the studies presented in table one fair worse by financial means 
than men; men’s incomes either decline to a lesser extent, or even gain once they have less 
people with whom to share (Andreβ 2006, Assave et al 2007, Burkhauser, Duncan & 
Berntsen 1990, De Wilde 2003, Fausta et al 2009, Hoffman & Duncan 1985, 1988, Jarvis & 
Jenkins 1999, Peterson 1996, Regt et al 2012, Smock et al 1999, Uunk 2004, Uunk & De 
Wilde 2008, Weitzman 1985).   
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Table 1 Economic Consequences of divorce from selected studies and countries 
Country Author(s) Period Total (n) % change * 
Women Men 
Austria Uunk 1994-2000 52 -30 N/A 
Belgium Dewilde (2003) 1994-1996 N/A 7 N/A 
Andreβ et al (2006) N/A 404 -20 0 
Uunk  (2004) 1994-2000 63 -20 N/A 
Denmark Dewilde (2003) 1994-1996 N/A -24 N/A 
Uunk  (2004) 1994-2000 41 -13 N/A 
Finland Uunk  (2004) 1994-2000 61 -13 N/A 
France Uunk (2004) 1994-2000 60 -32 N/A 
Germany Burkhauser et al (1990) 1983-1986 101 -44 -7 
Sorensen (1994) 1984 N/A -80 N/A 
Dewilde (2003) 1994-1996 N/A -6 N/A 
Andreβ et al (2006) N/A 1437 -32 -2 
Uunk  (2004) 1994-2000 157 -25 N/A 
Greece Uunk  (2004) 1994-2000 34 -11 N/A 
Ireland Uunk (2004) 1994-2000 30 -26 N/A 
Italy Dewilde (2003) 1994-1996 N/A -13 N/A 
Uunk  (2004) 1994-2000 69 -3 N/A 
Andreβ et al (2006) N/A 111 -33 5-7 
Faust & Maggiolaro 
(2009) 
1994-2001 304 -14 21 
Netherlands Uunk  (2004) 1994-2000 69 -19 N/A 
Portugal Uunk  (2004) 1994-2000 71 -12 N/A 
Spain Uunk (2004) 1994-2000 67 -17 N/A 
Sweden Sorensen (1994) 1981 N/A -63 N/A 
Andreβ et al (2006) N/A 353 -20 -7 
United 
Kingdom 
Jarvis and Jenkins (1999) 1991-2004 253 -18 2 
Dewilde (2003) 1994-1996 N/A -27 N/A 
Uunk  (2004) 1994-2000 145 -24 N/A 
Andreβ et al (2006) N/A 1114 -28 2-5 
United 
States 
 
Burkhauser et al (1990) 1983-1986 540 -24 -6 
Weitzman (1985) 1977-1978 275 -73 42 
Duncan & Hoffman 
(1985) 
1969-1975 1128 -30 11 
Petersen (1996) 1977-1978 322 -27 10 
Sorensen (1994) 1986 N/A -71 N/A 
NA - Not provided or not analysed 
    
*Different methods and models mean % changes are not directly comparable due to different 
methods, data types and variables. Purely descriptive. 
 
 
Much of the research regarding the divergent economic trends following 
divorce for men and women came following the early seminal work by Weitzman (1985) 
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and other contemporary analysis of the economic consequences of divorce following 
changes to US divorce laws in the late 1970s and 1980s (Burkhauser, Duncan & Bernsten 
1990, Peterson 1996, Hoffman & Duncan 1985, 1988, Weitzman 1985). These changes 
moved divorce settlements towards one of no fault divorce and consequently triggered a 
great deal of interest an analysis into not only their effects, but consequently the economic 
consequences of divorce more broadly.  
 
Weitzman’s findings had been contradictory to the expected effects of no fault 
divorce, which had aimed to seek a fair an equal distribution of assets following divorce, 
but had in fact, when considering incomes, created the alternative (Weitzman 1985). 
According to Weitzman (1985), by focusing primarily on easily dividable assets such as 
savings, property and other physical assets, the real assets of a marriage, in terms of wage 
earning potential were being ignored. What Weitzman was referring to is not only the 
distribution of the costs of marriage in the sense of children, their custody and their 
associated costs and difficulties with employment, but also the benefits of marriage in the 
sense of one partners superior wage earning potential, viewed as a product of said 
marriage. It is this theory which Weizman claims is behind the dramatic 71% decline for 
women and 41% increase for men in her sample in 1971 (Weitzman 1985). With one 
partner having taken a predominant role in raising a family, typically the woman, and the 
other freer to pursue a labour-market career as a result, there is a distinct earnings inequity 
once that partnership ends (Weitzman 1985).  
 
What followed was both further analysis of the effect of no fault divorce but 
also much and significant criticism of Weizmann’s figures ((Burkhauser, Duncan & 
Bernsten 1990, Peterson 1996, Hoffman & Duncan 1985, 1988). Indeed further analysis of 
Weitzman’s own and similar US data have indicated the fall to be much closer in the region 
of a 27% for women’s incomes and a 10% increase for men (Hoffman & Duncan 1988, 
Peterson 1996). As highlighted by Peterson these figures are much closer to others 
reported at the time after controlling for observable characteristics and differences between 
men and women (Peterson 1996).  
 
 The no fault divorce laws in California which Weitzman (1985) and others 
discuss are representative of broader changes and trends in both divorce laws and 
settlements between partners across developed countries the decades following the 80s 
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(Ribot 2011). In most European contexts, and particularly the USA and Britain, the process 
of divorce has moved from one in which the post marital division focuses on long term 
alimony, child maintenance and maintaining pre marriage standards of living for spouses, 
to one in which a clean break is sought and both partners are expected to be dependent on 
their own labour markets earnings (Weitzman 1985 Ribot 2011). Ribot (2011) found that 
this was an increasing trend across developed countries which is in tension with ideas of a 
traditional division of labour within the household, which still persist, because of the 
potential inequities in labour market earnings upon divorce (Ribot 2011).  
 
 Since then studies have been conducted across various developed countries 
including individual studies and comparative studies, as can be seen from table one above. 
What is apparent is that the different economic outcomes between men and women vary 
greatly by geographic context. Much of this can be explained by the popular welfare 
typology and combinations with attitudes and support for female labour force 
participation; however the picture is still not consistent enough for one to be confident of 
claiming a fully representative figure both nationally and cross nationally (Andreβ 2006, De 
Wilde 2003, Uunk 2004,). As well as this, many of the studies have very small samples, 
something which to some extent this study seeks to ameliorate with the UK by being larger 
than the earlier ones, Andreβ excepted, and longer, covering 1992-2008.  
 
 Much of the difference in coefficients between countries, if not the difference 
between men and women appears to be explained using a variation of the popular 1990 
Epsing-Andersen welfare (Andreβ 2006, De Wilde 2003, Uunk 2004). The most recent 
example of this Andreβ (2006) divided countries by the level and type of welfare, but then 
further by family type for high spending countries and alternative support network for low 
spending countries (Andreβ 2006). In this sense, a high welfare spending country like 
Denmark or Sweden would be classed as closer to a high welfare dual earner model of 
spending, whereas Belgium or Germany a high spending, with traditional division of labour 
(Andreβ 2006). In contrast the Anglo-Saxon market orientated countries such as the UK 
and Ireland would class as low spending, but with a preference for the labour market and 
private solutions to drops in income following divorce. The final group of countries, such 
as Italy, would be welfare spending and with the extended family or social networks as 
support following divorce (Andreβ 2006).  
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 What they found through multivariate regression when controlling for 
observable characteristics, such as number of children and education was that a) women in 
countries such as Sweden where both partners typically worked full time during marriage 
suffered the least in total, but the income decline is the longest lasting and for both 
partners (Andreβ 2006). Other countries faired differently over all with significant declines 
for women in each, but with Germany, Belgium and Great Britain coming out largely the 
same (Andreβ 2006). Of interest from this study is the role of the division of labour within 
the households of countries fairing worse, in each it has been ascribed closer to a 
traditional division of labour. What this means, the authors argue, is that with one partners 
devoted to family care or working part time during marriage, they are less able to command 
higher wages following divorce (Andreβ 2006).  When this is connected with the greater 
likelihood of child custody and its associated impediments to better or full-time 
employment through affordable or available child-care the picture is more difficult for 
divorced women (Andreβ 2006). Again this research fits with ideas of labour market 
earnings potential inequities being produced by a traditional division of labour in tension 
with the post-divorce economic reality and is therefore something necessary to control for 
in explaining income declines in this study. Andreβ et al compared countries by their 
dominant characteristics; however in the study we will compare families by their actual pre 
divorce habits and seek to quantify their effect.  
 
 Another important finding into the way women overcome the economic 
consequences of divorce is the role of remarriage and re-partnering. Research has long 
shown that those who re-marry move into cohabitation or recover, in terms of household 
income, better than those who stay single (De Wilde & Uunk 2008).  Uunk and De Wilde 
tested the economic need hypothesis by which those women who suffer the greatest 
income declines are most likely to re-marry and found that across an eleven country 
European Union panel this was the case; not only this, but the greater degree of income 
decline, regardless of the level of welfare provision in a country, the greater the likelihood 
of re-marriage (Uunk & De Wilde 2008). This is important theoretically for this paper and 
therefore will be included in all models in order to show the different economic 
consequences by present relationship status following divorce.   
 
 An important question with regards to the economic consequences of divorce 
for women is with regard to any inherent differences between those who divorce and those 
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who do not; i.e would those who stay married have the same experience of divorce if they 
did? This is not a problem in models assessing the effect of an event on an individual’s 
income, as a comparison between pre and post-divorce captures this, but for comparisons 
to married men and women across society in order to get a full picture of the economic 
status of divorce individuals, this is a problem as in this study. Research by Smock et al 
(1999) has shown how the economic effect of divorce is actually relatively pervasive for 
women; using endogenous switching regression models that those who stay married would 
have the same economic outcome as those who actually divorce. The reverse is however 
not true for those who divorce, their analysis shows that they would fare better than their 
divorce outcomes, but less well than those who chose to stay married (Smock et al 1999). 
What this confirms is, whilst their appear to be differences between those who divorce and 
those who do not had they stayed married, the association between divorce and income 
declines on women in their study is the same (Smock et al 1999)   
 
Whilst the above has shown that economic inequities between men and 
women following divorce, though varying, are persistent in different contexts, when 
considering alternate measures to income, a different picture is visible. It has been show 
that non-monetary measures of wellbeing, such as ability to afford a holiday, to adequately 
keep and heat the home, or to afford to socialize on a weekly basis, often tell a significantly 
different story about post marital economic inequities (Assave, Betti, Muzzuxo & Mencarini 
2007).  Assave et al (2007) found the common gender income inequities across European 
countries, but at different levels in each, following divorce when considering monetary 
measures alone, but also found that when specifying models with primary and secondary 
deprivation measures as dependent variables, the gap was much less. The study was 
conducted using data between 1994 and 2001 and found that, for example for the UK and 
other countries of the liberal welfare typology, the gender gap was minimal when 
considering non-income measures (Assave 2007). 
 
The authors postulate that the causes of this narrower gap when taking into 
account primary and secondary deprivation measures is associated with the new costs 
separating and divorcing husbands encounter, such as alimony payments (Assave et al 
2007). Indeed, as they highlight, it is more likely for the male partner to leave the family 
home and face the costs of setting up a new home (Assave et al 2007).   
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That being said, whilst this is innovative in showing that, when considering 
these costs and their potential association with quality of life measures, there is a smaller 
gap, it has to be understood in the context of post marital gender income inequality. For 
instance, if a male divorcee is statistically more likely to have a higher income, at least 
initially, and much more likely subsequently too, he is much better placed to face these one 
off costs. Not only this, but their higher incomes may well likely persist beyond these one 
off costs of setting up a home, providing a lifelong advantage from their marriage; in this 
context, the size and causes of economic inequities of income following divorce remain 
paramount.  
 
Other important research is that concerning the gender pay gap more generally 
and its commonly accepted components which are relevant for this study; in particular that 
associated with the motherhood penalty (Budig and England 2001, Budig et al 2012). 
Mothers have consistently been found to have lower incomes, even after controlling for 
labour market hours which may be affected by child care, losses of human capital due to 
maternity leave or long term work place absences and the number of children (Budig and 
England 2001, Budig et al 2012). This is relevant for this study as the majority of divorced 
women retain custody of any children from a marriage and so any associated labour market 
costs will most likely apply here also. This study also used per hourly wage, which would 
remove any effect of working part time. Unfortunately for this study, per hour wage is not 
available as a dependent income variable and so part time status will have to be controlled 
for, to see how much of the relevant penalties and income decline it accounts for. This is 
of even more relevance in light of the figures discussed above for female part time working 
in the UK. 
 
Specifically concerning previous studies in the UK, while as previously stated 
the coefficients are not directly comparable as the measures and methods used vary, the 
size has varied to some degree presenting a conflicting picture. Each controls for age, 
education, number of children and current employment status however whilst the studies 
have covered similar or crossing over periods, the decline for women varies between 18% 
and 28% and only two have covered men, showing a small gain (De Wilde 2003, Uunk 
2004, Jarvis and Jenkins 1999, Andreβ 2006 ). Typically the UK in each of these studies has 
represented the liberal welfare model, with little support designed specifically for divorcees, 
a preference for private financial solutions between partners and the Labour market as the 
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predominant source of income. In this sense, with the UK typically having high rates of 
part time working amongst married and divorced women and the highest number of single 
mothers, the income decline has been one of the largest in all of the studies covered above.  
 
One of the benefits of this study is that the time period covered goes beyond 
that of earlier studies which covered only periods within and up until the year 2000. This 
study contains observations from the British Household Panel reaching from 1992 until 
2008 and with a higher number of individuals then all but one of the previous studies. We 
take two different approaches, looking at the relationship between current marital status as 
a divorced man or woman to get a broader picture in society, as well as looking at a much 
smaller sample of only people who are married at time t and divorce at t+1. The benefit 
here is to get a fuller picture of the status and economic determinants associated with 
divorced individuals and also measure of those undergoing divorce. 
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Theoretical Background  
 
Important to any study of the economic consequences of divorce is a theoretical 
mechanism for how these potential negative costs for women and children can come to be. 
In this respect what is important is the economic theory of why people may marry and the 
subsequent division of labour which may theoretically occur thereafter during a marriage. 
The seminal works by Becker on his theory of marriage (Becker 1973, 1974, 1985) are 
central here in viewing marriage in the classical economic framework of maximising 
household gains through specialisation. What this refers to is a specialisation via the 
division of labour within the household, with one member, typically the female focusing on 
household labour and child care to a larger degree and the male focusing more on labour 
market activity (Becker 1973, 1974, 1985). This may not necessarily mean that one partner 
is unemployed and responsible for family care, though that would be its most extreme 
form; alternative possibilities can be one partner working part-time hours or flexible hours. 
Alternatively other examples could be if one partner makes a career decision based on the 
others, such as moving for a partner’s job or even hours or location determined by child 
care, the school day or school location. What this means is that in either scenario one 
partners career choices, typically the wife’s are subject to the family and other partner’s 
career. This specialisation, arguably, allows each to focus more on one particular type of 
work with potential positive human capital and wage earning effects for the labour market 
specialist and negative labour market ones for the household specialist (Becker 1973, 1974).  
 
In this sense marriage can be seen as a partnership to maximise overall 
household gains through the wage earning ability of one partner by allowing a greater focus 
on their labour market work and human capital accumulation. The implication here is that 
the higher wage earning ability of one partner is a consequence of both partners division of 
labour (Becker 1973, 1974, 1985 Weitzman 1985). Arguably their work performance can 
benefit and consequently their wage growth; if they lack the childcare commitments or 
responsibilities they are less likely to need to leave work for child care emergencies, less 
tired from child care responsibilities and due to the absence of childcare commitments less 
tied to the normal 9-5 work schedule. Indeed, the potential inequalities in earnings abilities, 
is the theoretical mechanism which Weitzman (1985) refers to in explaining the significant 
drops in income experienced by women and children following divorce; the traditional 
division creates wage earning inequities which have pernicious consequences following 
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divorce when the benefits and costs of marriage have to be shared.  Indeed one of the 
main expectations of this study is that those women, who prior to divorce worked part 
time, will have a greater income decline.  
 
This theoretical model of the functioning of a marriage is theoretically difficult 
for women and children due to the changes in divorce law and settlement trends already 
mentioned above (Weitzman 1985 Ribot 2011). If in a traditional division of labour within 
a marriage one of the major household assets is the earnings potential of one partner, but 
divorce settlements seek a clean break between partners, focusing only on present tangible 
assets such as the household, the labour market specialist is at a distinct advantage. They 
will keep their wage earning potential and be, arguably, better off in any post-divorce 
settlement in which both partners are dependent on the labour market for future support.  
 
 The role of children here is also of theoretical importance for potential 
divergent economic consequences of divorce for men and women. As discussed already, 
being responsible for children, particularly as a lone parent comes with its own potential 
labour market difficulties (Budig and England 2001, Budig et al 2012). Children pose 
several potential employment difficulties, including the high cost and availability of child 
care and also the potential attachment to daytime or school hours which can place 
restrictions on the number and time of hours worked. Having children may also impact 
earnings due to potential absences from work. When children are sick one parent typically 
is called away, therefore affecting workplace presenteeism. Additionally, being a lone parent 
also has potentially theoretical implications for overall productivity resulting from the 
fatigue and stress associated with parenting alone (Budig and England 2001, Budig et al 
2012). This is of particular significance for this study and it is expected that controlling for 
children and their number will ameliorate some of the penalty associated with women and 
the premium with men. Not only this, but owing to the proportion of part time workers in 
the UK, particularly amongst single mothers and women, it is expected that controlling for 
labour supply, in the form of part time hours will further narrow the gap between divorced 
men and women in overall household income. 
  
 Of importance here again in explaining the expected outcomes in the UK is 
the Welfare state paradigm (Andreβ 2006, De Wilde 2003, Uunk 2004, Jarvis and Jenkins 
1999). As already discussed the level of welfare support in the UK is lower than other 
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European countries. It is typically means tested and low focusing on specific problems 
such as unemployment, sickness and disabilities (Andreβ 2006, De Wilde 2003, Uunk 2004, 
Jarvis and Jenkins 1999). The aim is not to provide a specific standard of living or support 
post-divorce incomes, but to alleviate the worst of poverty or unemployment and is 
therefore limited (Andreβ 2006, De Wilde 2003, Uunk 2004, Jarvis and Jenkins 1999). 
What this means is that the drop for women may be large without a safety net to support 
or supplement incomes on the level found in other European countries (Andreβ 2006, De 
Wilde 2003, Uunk 2004, Jarvis and Jenkins 1999).   
 
 
 
 Data, Methodology and Sample Selection 
 
i) Data Source 
 
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is a longitudinal panel study following British 
households annually between 1991 and 2008. The sample began in 1991 with a 
representative sample of British Households and aimed to follow the same individuals until 
2008 when it merged with a new panel study, Understanding families. Unlike cross 
sectional studies, this data allows us to monitor the association of divorce with income 
over time and capture the changes in income following the event, avoiding any upward 
biases commonly associated with cross sectional studies. The study now forms part of the 
European Community Household Panel and so is comparable in data collection to other 
studies of this type completed in Britain and other countries at different points, making the 
findings particularly suited to any subsequent comparison. This study seeks to use waves 
from 1992-2008 which contain a rough sample of 5500 individuals from 10,000 households 
in total. 
 
The time frame available gives an opportunity to looks at the association 
between income and divorce over a considerably longer time frame than used elsewhere. 
The study follows individuals in the initial samples households and also all individuals 
joining those households, however if they subsequently leave following a divorce or some 
other event, they are not followed; meaning only the relationship of divorce with income 
on original sample members can be assessed. This also means that we are often not 
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observing direct couples divorcing, as partners who were not part of the original sample are 
not followed once they leave and there simply are not enough of both who stay. Another 
consideration or difficulty here is that a number of individuals have not been observed at 
each wave; this is in addition to sample attrition in that often individuals are missing for a 
particular year, but return later on. The consequence of this is increased difficulty for the 
model focusing on the association of divorce with income on for individuals observed 
directly before and after the event as there are only a small number of people with 
observations either side.   
 
The interviews are conducted on an annual basis and the key variables for this 
question, such as current marital status; i.e cohabitation, marriage and divorce are surveyed 
at each annual interval, but also through a retrospective history meaning the data collected 
at each point is relevant to this research question. Others change between years, but the 
key variables of household income, marital status, family and economic characteristic stay 
the same, allowing us to capture the key independent and dependent variables.  
 
ii) Sample Selection 
 
Each wave of the BHPS has over 12 files with various information from each relevant for 
this study. Most can be aggregated via a unique ID between waves, however many are not 
and so need to be connected within each wave by determining variables which are unique 
and constructing new ones so that they can be connected in cross sections for each year 
and then between years. Many files have different values for unique information per 
individual to others and so it has not been a standardised process with much variation in 
practice between years.  As a result, due to the complexity, size and also time constraints 
associated with a thesis, an alternative route to constructing the data has been chosen to 
including every year of observation between 1992 and 2008. 
 
Instead cross sections have been constructed with time points every five years 
between 1992 and 2008; the first year of observation therefore being 1992, 1997, 2002, and 
2007, giving four cross sections which then are connected. As well as this, the final year 
included in the sample, 2008 has been chosen also due to the presence of divorces in 2007; 
by including 2008 it makes it possible to view one year of information following those 
divorces and increasing the number of observations of divorces.  
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An important benefit of constructing the data in this way is that it allows for a 
much longer study of income and divorce and also something which practically is much 
more suitable given time constraints  
 
The sample then needed to be cut down to just those people of interest to the 
research question. The full sample of all 5 time points contained married and other 
individuals who did not divorce at all and would therefore be unsuitable. This is because 
those who stay married have been proven to have different characteristics then those who 
do not, which are associated with income and therefore may make estimates of their 
differences overly biased (Hoffman & Duncan 1995).  Instead the sample has been cut down 
to just those who divorce between 1993, one year after the first observation and 2008 so 
that the date of the divorce can be used to check the association between divorce and 
income.  
 
There were many people who had experienced divorces before 1993, for which the 
data source includes the date and so could have been included in the sample. This has not 
been carried out, however, due to the way in which the BHPS has collected this 
information; for many, the date was not available or has simply been put as 1991 if no 
information was available (the year before this sample started) and so it is not possible to 
know when the divorce actually happened. To include these and use this date would simply 
not work as the time since divorce would be highly inaccurate and therefore biasing any 
estimates on time since divorce with income and would be highly too prone to error.  
 
It is also important to recognise that the date of divorce itself for many couples is 
not the mechanism for any association with income decline, as most would actually have 
already separated prior to a legal divorce. One option which was attempted was to use the 
dates of separation instead of divorce to select the sample for use here in order to capture 
this potential relationship with income, but unfortunately, the difference in size of sample 
was simply too great. A significant number of people who divorced have not had a date of 
their separation collected and it could both affect any models though small sample size and 
potential selectivity bias between those who have a date and do not.  
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The sample was also restricted to those individuals who have just one divorce. 
There were some who had multiple divorces, but again, due to the risk of unobserved 
heterogeneity akin to that between those who don’t divorce and those who do, these 
individuals have been censored so that only those with one divorce during the sample have 
been included.   
 
Of considerable importance is also the way in which this information has been 
collected. Marital histories which include the dates of any divorces, as separate from 
current marital status, were not collected in every single wave of the BHPS. They were 
collected in waves 2, 11 and 12, with wave 11 acting as a retrospective history. This gives a 
potential selectivity bias in that the many of the marital histories present are only those 
within the sample who stayed until wave 11. This has implications for the applicability of 
any estimates, as there could be specific characteristics in common between those who stay 
and income which are different than those who leave.  
 
Another potential weakness of this sample is the higher proportion of women 
following sample selection, as can be seen from the descriptive statistics by gender in the 
appendix; the sample is very heavily weighted toward women, something which was not 
present in the full sample. Reasons for this appear to be that men are much more likely to 
leave the family home following a divorce and so are much more likely to be 
uncontactable. In addition, as was commented by Jenkins and Jarvis in (1999,) during the 
90s and 2000s in the UK there was concerted push to catch fathers who were in arrears 
with child support payments, which may have contributed to fathers being unwilling to 
participate. In either case this appears to have reduced the number of men in the sample to 
roughly 61% female and 39% male.  
 
This is a serious drawback to applicability of estimates from this study and means 
any conclusions need to be caveated with the observation that they only apply to those 
who stayed in the sample. There is serious risk of selection into, or out of the sample due 
to reasons such as low income; arguably as Jenkins and Jarvis argue; if people are leaving to 
avoid paying their child support, this could be because their incomes are low. This is an 
important problem as it could mean that those who stay are the ones for whom the 
economic consequences of divorce are less severe, subsequently upwardly biasing any 
estimates for divorced men.   
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In addition all missing observations of income have been removed along with those 
outside the 18 – 60 age range. Missing observations of the dependent variably are clearly of 
no use and those outside of this range have different issues which could bias any estimates 
of income. With regards to those below 18, there household income will be the same as 
their parents anyway and so is not relevant; furthermore they are extremely unlikely to have 
experienced a divorce and are also likely to be in full time education and so incomes will be 
much lower than the remaining sample anyway. With regards to the elderly, it is well 
established that moves into retirement and pensions and associated income changes of 
their own which can therefore mask or bias any association between divorce and income.  
 
Another category removed has been those who are self-employed. Whilst they are 
still theoretically relevant, their incomes are subject to extreme variation, particularly 
considering the independent variable is net current household income in pounds per week. 
This causes problems as it confused estimates that are just associated with common 
fluctuations in income associated with self-employment with changes resulting from 
divorce. As result of this, these and others have all been removed to give a sample of those 
who have one divorce between 1992-2008 , aged between 18 and 60, who stay in the 
sample and are not self-employed. A full set of statistics on the two samples by sex and 
also by marital status mixed with sex can be seen in the appendix;  
 
 
iii)  Models 
 
The first set of models seeks to assess the situation of divorced men and women within 
the sample more broadly then just assessing those with observations directly before and 
after divorce. This will be done by comparing individuals within the sample by current a) 
marital status whilst controlling for other relevant economic characteristics and then b) 
observing changes to the divorce financial penalty or premium as the research question 
variables are added in the subsequent four models as can be seen from models 1 to 4 
below.  The model used is a pooled OLS regression model, or constant coefficients model 
checking coefficients across all cross sections.  
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Model one; Gender differences 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠/𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
 
Model one focuses on the basic differences between individuals by marital status mixed 
with sex after controlling for educational and employment differences. As we saw within 
the descriptive statistics, men and particularly divorced men, appeared to have higher 
education and were more likely to be employed; with this in mind it is expected that there 
will be a greater decline associated with being a divorced female, but due to educational and 
employment differences observed within the descriptive statistics it should be lower than 
the 24% penalty when compared to married men.  
 
Model two: No of Children 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠/𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
 
This model is designed to capture the effects and costs associated with having children. 
The descriptive statistics showed that divorced women are much more likely to have 
children living with them and divorced men the most likely not to have children within the 
home of all groups. In this sense it is a major advantaged enjoyed by divorced men within 
the sample as they are potentially avoiding the theoretical costs associated with them. It is 
expected that this will remove any premium associated with divorced men. 
 
Model three: Labour Supply 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠/𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡  +  𝑢𝑖𝑡  
 
Model three is designed to test the theory that one of the problems facing divorced women 
is the need to work reduced hors due the limits posed by having children through available 
child-care and school time hours etc. As we saw in the descriptive statistics a high number 
of divorced women worked in part time jobs, particularly relative to men, and so this 
model is designed to capture this effect and quantify how much of the penalty associated 
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with divorced women is due to this. It is expected that this will reduce it, but that the 
penalty will likely remain to some significant degree afterwards.  
 
Model four: Type of job 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1 + 𝛽𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠/𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑛𝑜 𝑜𝑓 𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛽𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑆𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽𝑗𝑜𝑏𝑡𝑦𝑝𝑒 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡  
 
This model is designed to check the how much of the premium or penalty associated with 
divorced men and women in turn is due to them being in different job categories. Each job 
category is expected to have different determinants of pay, such as managerial, technical 
and professional being higher paid and skilled, partly skilled and unskilled being less well 
paid in that order. The expectation here is that because dud to married and divorced men 
being more likely to be in the higher paying groups, they will see less change. 
 
Model 5: Time since divorce 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 =
 𝛽1 + 𝛽𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
 𝑢𝑖𝑡  
 
Model 5 is designed to interact with gender with the time it takes to recover from divorce. 
We know theoretically that women have greater declines and so it is expected that the first 
category of 1-3 years will show the greatest decline for women, which will be ameliorated 
in the subsequent categories of 3-5 years and 5-10 years.  
 
Model 6: Balanced Sample 
 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑒/𝑠𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡  + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡
2 + 𝛽𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽𝑐ℎ𝑖𝑙𝑑𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝑠𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑣𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽𝑝𝑟𝑒 − 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑟 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑦𝑖𝑡 +  𝑢𝑖𝑡  
 
In this model the sample is reduced to only those people with two time points either side 
of the date they divorced. The basic model above will be ran but with the addition of their 
pre-divorce labour supply in order to test the theory that those who have reduced human 
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capital due to absences from the labour market are the ones who lose out the most. The 
reduced sample and its characteristics can be seen in the appendix.  
 
The first 5 models do have several problems however for estimation due to 
inherent biases that need to be considered. Whilst some bias has been removed by focusing 
only on those who have one divorce between 1992 and 2008, some remains. The current 
marital status variable being used to assess the economic status of divorced men and 
women only measures the effect of those who stay in this state and is therefore subject to 
selectivity which could bias estimates. Not only this, but within the pooled sample they are 
being compared to married men before they divorce and also those who re-marry. This 
needs to be considered when reviewing estimates from these models, as there are likely to 
be unobserved differences between those who re-marry and do not also associated with 
income, which are likely to bias these estimates. This is important caveat to any conclusions 
drawn from these first models regarding the broader economic situation of divorcees. 
 
In order to try to ameliorate this weakness a further separate model (Model 6) 
has been estimated looking at just those individuals for whom there are direct observations 
in two time points either side of their divorce in order to review the associated income 
change more closely with the event. This also allows the possibility to test theories in 
relation to reduced labour supply during marriage effecting  as will human capital and post-
divorce outcomes. Unfortunately, as can be seen in the descriptive statistics for this second 
model, the number of people with observations either side is relatively small. As mentioned 
previously not only do a number of people leave the sample, but for many there is 
information missing in particular waves, even though they are present later on. This could 
theoretically have been improved by using more waves of data, but due to time constraints 
this has not been possible.   
 
Current Net Household Income 
 
In previous uses of the British Household Panel Survey, net household income was not 
available and so previous studies had to impute this based on income liabilities for tax. 
From 1999 this has subsequently changed and has been updated for all previous waves 
before wave 7 in 1999 and has been collected from wave 8 onwards and so current net 
household income is used here. Current Net Household Income is in pounds per week and 
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includes total household cash income from all household members. This includes money 
earned from employment, self-employment, investments, savings, pensions, social security 
and also maintenance payments (but only receipt). It is also post tax and so all income 
taxes, national insurance contributions, local and council taxes have already been deducted.  
 
 Income has been equalized using the modified OECD scale and adjusted to 
January 2010 prices to take into account household composition within income and 
inflation over the sample. The OECD scale is important to capture any changes associated 
with household composition and income, such as more or less members and their financial 
needs. This is important as following divorce women typically retain custody of any 
children and so this must be taken into account via household composition.  
 
Modified OECD Equivalence Scale 
Head 
  
0.67 
Subsequent Adults 
 
0.33 
Each Child aged 0-13 0.2 
Each child aged 14-18 0.33 
     
There are a number of different versions of these scales, with different 
measurements given to each different member of the household and there is not 
necessarily a clear assessment of which is most appropriate. Previous studies have used the 
McClements scale for the UK, citing its use by the UK Governments Department of Work 
and Pensions, however this has since changed and the official scale now used is the 
Modified OECD scale show above and so this has been used here, but sensitivity checked 
by using the McClements scale also. 
 
Net current household income already includes maintenance payments from ex 
partners however these have not been deducted from partners who pay them. This was 
collected from 1992 onwards and has been measured on a weekly basis so that it can be 
deducted from current net household income, which is also a pound per week variable. 
The effect can be seen clearly for divorced men in the descriptive statistics in the appendix 
where current net household income before and after maintenance deductions have been 
taken, reducing the mean and median income for divorced men by £20 and £12 
respectively. These clearly are small sums, however not all divorced men have children and 
the effect will be lost.  
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Current Net Household income minus maintenance payments 
  n  Mean 0.05 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.95 
2850 459.5 153.5 199.1 282.1 403.1 575.1 767.4 920.7 
lowest -80.42 -44.83 -23.39 -19.2 -18.1 
   highest: 2325.52 2418.54 2578.87 3752.56 4709.09 
    
As can be seen from the above table, there are some significant outliers shown 
by the numbers well above and below the 5th and 95th percentiles. The observations shown 
here is minus those who are self-employed, under 18 and over 60 who often having highly 
fluctuating incomes, and so the existence of these outliers is concerning. This leads to 
expectations that these outliers could have an effect on the accuracy of any estimation and 
likely heteroscedasticity. As a result of this logged income will be used in the model to 
attempt to normalise the variance and when sensitivity checking the robustness of any 
estimates, these outliers above the 5th and 95th percentiles will be removed test the 
robustness of the estimates.  
 
There are also a small number of observations as minus values. No explanation 
is given in the BHPS documentation, but assumptions are that this is potentially due to the 
nature of weekly income variables fluctuating, particularly for people on low or 
temporary/zero hours contracts and the effect of the scale. Most negative incomes were 
for self-employed people, however a small number remain. An examination of who they 
are to see if there is anything consistent, such as unemployment does not show anything 
clear; many are employed and it does not appear to be through deductions made by 
maintenance as none have had maintenance deductions. As a result of this, due to a lack of 
theoretically valid reasons to exclude them from the sample, they have been left in; as 
mentioned above however, they will be removed for sensitivity analysis to test for the 
robustness of any model estimates.  
 
Another problem with this variable is due to it being only pounds per week 
variable. Due to being for such a short time it is arguably subject to strong variation from 
temporary problems which would not appear in annual income, such as short term 
unemployment, lack of hours in a particular week or temporary jobs without sick pay. As a 
result of this observations are subject to any bias from events which would not show up in 
annual income variables and this needs to be born in mind when considering estimates. 
One other reason for choosing this variable over annual income is that maintenance 
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payments are also weekly and so fit perfectly already for deduction. There is also an 
argument that, if one of the consequences of divorce is short term economic stress, pounds 
per week income is more likely to pick this up if it is associated with divorce.  
 
iv) Descriptive Statistics 
 
The tables in the appendix show descriptive statistics for each variable by sex in the first 
table and by marital status mixed with sex in the second. Absolute numbers, percentages of 
total men/women and also mean incomes and ages are presented for comparison.  
 
Firstly, by sex it is clear that men have higher mean incomes and more 
advantageous circumstances in almost each variable. Men have a higher percentage 
cohabiting and married than women, indicating that they are more likely to find a new 
partner then stay as divorced; though arguably this again could be subject to stayer’s bias so 
caution is advised. Women within the sample appear more likely to stay separated or 
divorced and also have lower levels of education than men; indeed greater numbers 
identifying as no education, only up until 16 and then slightly higher numbers of men at 
each other advanced educational level. Men are also  more likely to be employed, more 
likely to have less children, more likely to work full time and more likely to be in higher 
paying professional or managerial jobs. Interestingly, however women do seem to 
predominate in the skilled non-manual service sector type jobs.  
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For divorced women and men the differences are even more pronounced then 
between the sexes across the whole sample. As can be seen from the graph presented 
above, divorced women on average have 36% less per week then divorced men and also 
less than all other groups by 25% and 20% to married men and women respectively.  When 
looking at the characteristics involved, it is much the same picture presented above 
between the sexes, but more pronounced. Divorced women have an alarming proportion 
of individuals identifying as having no education, but also more at just age 16 education 
then divorced men. In addition they are much more likely to have children and also to have 
more children living with them then divorced men. With regards to work they are more 
likely to work part time and more likely to be in partly skilled occupations and unskilled 
occupations then men. 
 
Interestingly there are high proportions of divorced men and women found 
within the disabled and long term sick category. Exact causes of this are hard to specify but 
arguably it could be that those with health problems find it harder to find a partner, or 
perhaps the stress of divorce etc. has caused sickness or depression. 
 
The final variable years since divorce can be seen below and has been 
categorised instead of being a continuous variable. This is in order to control for those who 
have not yet divorced and to avoid losing missing observations by losing them. The 
reference category is those who have not yet divorced and subsequent time categories since 
divorce to take into account the short and long term relationship between divorce and 
income.  
 
Years Since Divorce   
Cat Men Women 
Pre Divorce 544 821 
1-3 years 184 265 
3-5 years 99 178 
5-10 years 195 328 
10-15 years 83 143 
 
Concerning the three theoretical variables of interest there are a large number 
of divorced women working part time, but also an even larger number of married women, 
which could potentially indicate that many had gone full time upon marriage. With regards 
to divorcees working part time, this could be indicative of problems with unaffordable or 
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unavailable child care associated with the UK. This will likely lead to lower incomes for 
divorcees and so it will be interesting to quantify how much the addition of part time into 
the regression reduced the divorce penalty commonly found for women.  
 
Further concerning the hypotheses divorced men are much less likely to have 
children living with them then divorced men and so it is expected that any premium 
associated with being a divorced man will have a lot to do with this and again will become 
clear once this is controlled for in the regression.  
 
In the labour market there are differences too with women more likely to be in 
the skilled non-manual service sector typed jobs than in other skilled jobs or professional 
and managerial jobs, which could control for some of the difference between sexes.  
 
Results  
For full tables of results, coefficients and P values see appendix. The chosen level of 
significance for this paper is 0.05.  
 
i) Model one: Gender differences 
 
Model one by current marital status shows divorced women with roughly 19% lower 
earnings then married men, but also a small premium for divorced men of 12% compared 
to married men. This model takes into account the previous differences in education 
observed in the descriptive statistics between men and women and also divorced men and 
women.  
 
With regards to education both no education and having education only to GCSE, 
something more common amongst divorced women, are associated with heavy and 
significant negative coefficients with income. Whereas those of the reference category and 
undergraduate and post-graduate were more associated more with married men and 
divorced men, further highlighting inequities between divorced women and the rest.  
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ii) Model two: Children 
 
The second model after controlling for children shows that there is a negative financial 
relationship across the sample associated with children and income that is significant. It 
also eliminates the entire premium associated with divorced men, indicating that the benefit 
here was the unfair distribution of the costs of children following marriage. As we saw in 
the descriptive statistics divorced men are the least likely of the whole sample to live with 
children and so associated costs are arguably not relevant to them. Those with children ear 
significantly less at all frequencies of children.  
 
Interestingly, however the penalty associated with being a divorced woman has 
increased to roughly 24% and remained significant. This is potentially because the effect of 
many divorced women not having children was hiding higher a higher penalty for divorced 
women. 
 
 
iii) Model three: Labour Supply 
 
In this model employment status and labour supply were highly correlated, with VIF 
correlation scores both near to 5. When testing both and using both together, it has been 
found that the direction and significance of estimates remains the same, but there is some 
slight variation of the size of coefficients by 1-2%. As a result of this labour supply has 
been used instead to capture the association of the reduced labour supply observed in the 
descriptive statistics with income. 
 
Firstly working part time is significant and reduced income by roughly 17%. In 
addition to this the premium penalty associated with divorced women has been reduced to 
18% from 24%, a decline of 6% associated with the reduced labour supply relative to 
married men of divorced women.   
 
iv) Model four: Job Type 
 
 Model four controls for the different job sectors between divorced men and divorced 
women observed in the descriptive statistics. The penalty associated with divorcees has 
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increased to 20% and remains significant; however the job category variable has shown that 
the categories with the most women and divorced women included fair worst. Skilled non-
manual jobs earn less than the professional and managerial/technical which include more 
men. In addition the partly skilled and unskilled sectors are also much lower.  
 
v) Model 5: time since divorce 
 
The fifth model takes into account time since divorce, but also interacts with sex to see the 
income changes over time for both men and women following divorce relative to pre 
divorce observations. What can be seen from the years since divorce variable is the 
trajectory with the major decline in women’s incomes happing in the first 3 years after 
divorce with a penalty of roughly 20% compared to married men. This then reduces to 17 
3-5 years before dropping to roughly 12% from 5 years on wards.  
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Model 5 
  Coefficients Estimate t-value P (>|t|) sig 
Intercept 5.87 31.9161 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Marriage 
    Married ref - 
    
 
Cohabiting 0.040944 1.2549 0.209627 
 
 
Divorced -0.09081 -3.2541 0.001151 ** 
 
Separated -0.14656 -3.6409 0.000277 *** 
Education 
    Education till 18 ref - 
    
 
Age 16 (GCSE -0.23752 -5.6407 1.86E-08 *** 
 
Undergraduate 0.18146 4.8604 1.24E-06 *** 
 
Post-Graduate 0.46372 6.4524 1.29E-10 *** 
 
No Education -0.33796 -12.0606 < 2.2e-16 *** 
Age  0.009221 1.0226 0.306582 
 Age*  -5.2E-05 -0.4783 0.632454 
 Years since Divorce 
    
 
Pre Divorce ref- 
    
 
female married -0.15594 -4.9274 8.82E-07 *** 
 
Male 1-3 years 0.022435 0.4484 0.653878 
 
 
female 1-3 years -0.20439 -4.5969 4.48E-06 *** 
 
male 3-5 years 0.044694 0.7069 0.479681 
 
 
female 3-5 years -0.17052 -3.3824 0.000729 *** 
 
male 5-10 years 0.078469 1.5967 0.110441 
 
 
female 5-10 years -0.12408 -3.0026 0.0027 ** 
 
male 10-15 years -0.03372 -0.4986 0.618072 
 
 
female 10 - 15 years -0.12499 -2.2874 0.022246 * 
Sensitivty analysis 
    
 
Breusch Pagan 0.3048 
   
 
Adjusted R squared 0.13551 
     DF 2818       
       
 
Model 6: Reduced Labour Supply during marriage 
 
The aim of this particular model was to test the theory that the reason why divorced 
women earn less is due to loss of human capital associated with theories of a traditional 
division of labour within the household previously mentioned. In order to test this theory 
the sample was further restricted from that of the previous models; only those with 
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observations in two time sections with a divorce in between were selected. This allowed the 
possibility to create dummy variables for characteristics prior to divorce.  
 
In order to test this, a dummy variable was created for individual’s labour supply prior to 
divorce as either full or part time.  
 
What can be seen in the two models for model 6 is that the penalty before 
including pre-divorce Labour supply is of a similar magnitude to the others at 18% when 
controlling for age, education and employment status. When pre-divorce labour supply is 
included the penalty is no longer significant, but at a much lower level of 9% and is 
suggestive that much of the difference here between divorced men and women in this 
sample is simply due to labour supply.  
 
In previous models current employment status had been correlated to a small 
degree, below 5, with part time labour support and had been removed. This was a similar 
case in this model, but lower and still below 5. With this in mind the decision was made to 
leave both in to control for current employment and also previous labour supply in hours 
to try to answer the theoretical question about reduced labour supply.  
 
Caution is needed with this model however, as the sample has several 
drawbacks.  Firstly the selectivity involved in reducing this sample has several steps which 
have made it very selective and specific. Firstly as we already know it is only those with a 
divorce between 1992 and 2008 and so is not generalizable to the broader population. 
Additionally the sample is very small due to the difficulty in finding individuals at two of 
the five year cross section time for individuals with a divorce in-between. This involves 
selectivity bias as to those who left the sample, but also those who missed particular years. 
These could arguably be due to divorce from partners moving following divorce into new 
homes or other circumstances which could mean the sample here is subject to stayers bias.   
 
That being said it is an interesting finding which fits with theoretical positions 
outlined by both Weitzman (1985) and Becker (1973,1974,1985). Working part time during 
marriage is indicative of the traditional division of labour with one taking a reduced Labour 
supply and the other working full time.  
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This needs further analysis, likely with all years of the BHPS or a bigger sample 
in which more pre-divorce characteristics associated with marital labour supply can be 
included. Though interesting and informative of a potential reason for the penalty, it is not 
generalizable outside of the very small highly select sample in which it originates. Moreover 
it also needs to take into account the duration of reduced labour supply, this simply shows 
that they worked part time prior to divorce and it is associated with a significant income 
decline or at least the decline in the comparable model for divorced women more generally.   
 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 
Through visual of residuals and Breusch pagan tests it is clear that this sample is subject to 
heteroscedasticity, with some models much more susceptible then others. In order to solve 
this problem income was logged in order to normalise the distribution which improved 
both the adjusted R squared of all models and also the severity of heteroscedasticity, at 
least visually. The problem still remains however and seems to be primarily caused by 
significant outliers at both the high income, but also much more significantly the low 
incomes. 
  When testing the models for robustness they were ran with those at above the 
95 percentiles and below the 5 percentiles removed to give a more normal distribution of 
income. This significantly improved the adjusted R Squared values for all models and 
altered to a small degree some of the coefficient values; however the direction and 
significance levels of the key variables discussed remained the same.  
 
 The decision was made not to move to this distribution however and remove 
these lower value and higher values. There appears to be no theoretically sound reason to 
move them as they are within the parameters set in the sample selection for age, no self-
employment and having just one divorce between the time frames.  
 
Conclusions 
 
Before going on to make concluding remarks about the findings here, several caveats 
which limit the generalisability of these findings, but also may affect the accuracy of the 
estimates need to be re-stated to encourage caution. Firstly with regards to the sample 
itself’; with regards to models 1-5 the sample itself applies to only those within the highly 
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selective sample having a divorce between 1992 and 2008 and does not apply to self-
employed people. Additionally it is subject to stayer’s bias, which may have upwardly 
biased income estimates for divorced males. This can be seen in the higher proportion of 
men in the sample and the theoretical reasons highlighted by Jenkins and Jarvis (1999) on 
their study using the BHPS in the 1990s. Many of those men would have owed child 
support and there was considerable public attention at the time and afterwards in Britain 
about catching these people. In addition it is much more likely that men would leave the 
marital home and so there is a real chance that these measures are indeed upwardly biased 
by those with higher incomes.  
 
In addition the measure used to assess the status of divorcees was current 
marital status in each of the 5 year cross sections. As discussed this is also arguably subject 
selectivity with those with characteristics that influence low incomes also influencing the 
propensity for individuals not to re-partner. If this is the case then they would be 
downwardly biased and the results would be more applicable to those more likely to stay 
divorced, whatever their characteristics.  
 
In addition, the methodology used has not captured the association of the 
event of divorce with individual drops in income following divorce. Instead the models and 
design has focused on the penalties and premiums associated with those classifying as 
divorced men and women within the sample and why they earn differently to their married 
male counterparts. Whilst this does not give a direct individual association with change 
following divorce, it is illuminating as to the differing contributory factors influencing 
those lower incomes of those people within this sample classifying as divorced men and 
women. Furthermore, in addition to these caveats, the findings have been very similar to 
those of other studies conducted on UK data, with the exception of the final model, and so 
a measure of confidence is appropriate here as a result.  
 
With regards to the findings, from models 1-5 the penalty associated with 
divorced women has remained relatively static at between -18% and -20%, with exception 
of model two before labour supply and job type were controlled for. This is in common 
with other findings presented in the previous research, though at the lower end of other 
estimates. The most important thing for the penalty here appears to be the inclusion of 
labour supply, which brought the penalty down by 6% from the prior model. The inclusion 
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of other characteristics for which divorced men and women differ; education, children and 
job type failed to reduce the penalty below 18% in spite of the differences observed within 
the descriptive statistics section. 
 
With regards to men, the initial premium observed for divorced men in the 
descriptive statistics and also model one was eliminated after controlling for custody of 
children. Those who have children earn consistently less for having children and also each 
additional child; it is the absence of children which appears to be associated with the higher 
incomes for divorced men relative to married men here. This is suggestive of an unequal 
distribution of the costs of divorce, in spite of maintenance payments being included in 
income measurements.   
 
Concerning the final models on the subject of pre-divorce labour supply, 
caveats need to be made again before any concluding remarks can be made. This sample is 
both very small and highly selective which means its results are not strictly very 
generalizable. The selectivity was discussed with the model and means that one should be 
extremely careful in claiming how representative its findings are beyond the highly select 
individuals included. In addition the measure used for pre-divorced labour supply is only 
reflective of one year. Of much more interest would be to include a much more detailed 
analysis of reduced labour supply to get a more detailed measure of reduced human capital 
associated with more traditional divisions of labour within a marriage. As a result of this 
the findings may well be spurious and to do with the nature of the people within this 
second sample who have a high rate of part time working prior to divorce. That being said, 
the findings are suggestive of what could be a more useful research into the penalties 
observed within this sample for divorced women. The model made the penalty much 
lower, and more importantly statistically insignificant. With more time and scope it would 
have been useful to create more cross sections to add into the sample in order to get more 
couples with which to assess these findings. It would also have been possible to calculate a 
much fuller measure of reduced human capital by making a measure related to how long 
they were either out of the labour market or had reduced labour supply; that however was 
not possible and so this measure was used as a compromise.  
 
With regards to implications for previous research and theories discussed 
above, the findings from the models show consistent findings for income penalties for 
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divorced women common to in size to all other UK studies but at the lower range and also 
in the same direction to other studies of the economic consequences of divorce. With 
regards to theory, they confirm that the distribution of the costs of children are not shared 
evenly, something consistently argued by other authors (Andreβ 2006, Assave et al 2007, 
Burkhauser, Duncan & Berntsen 1990, De Wilde 2003, Fausta et al 2009, Hoffman & 
Duncan 1985, 1988, Jarvis & Jenkins 1999, Peterson 1996, Regt et al 2012, Smock et al 
1999, Uunk 2004, Uunk & De Wilde 2008, Weitzman 1985). In addition the propensity, 
particularly in the UK, for women to work part-time is significant in reducing the penalty 
to some degree and is informative of the potential relationship between the difficulties of 
lone parenthood and unaffordable or unavailable childcare. What is more the final model, 
for all its limitations, is also informative of potential further explanation of the penalty 
associated with divorced women. It fits with theories highlighted by Weitzman (1985) and 
Beckers theory of the family (1973, 1974 and 1985) and is suggestive about what more 
research could have been done here with more time and for further research more 
generally.  
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